The 2026 India-EU Security and Defence Partnership

Introduction

India and the European Union are both adjusting their defence postures amid a highly volatile and complex geopolitical environment. For the EU, the strategic priority is to build a stronger and more integrated defence industrial base that can sustain higher procurement and readiness levels, reflected in initiatives such asthe ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 proposal to mobilise up to EUR 800 billion in defence investment. On the other hand, for India, the core objective is to reduce external dependence through “Make in India” and diversify defence partners while maintaining independent decision-making, often framed as strategic autonomy¹.

The India-EU Security and Defence Partnership, signed on 27 January 2026, moves defence issues closer to the centre of the relationship, alongside the Towards 2030: A New Joint EU-India Comprehensive Strategic Agenda². This brief examines how EU policy conditionalities, technology transfer, and funding intersect with India’s strategic autonomy goals, identifying where interests converge, where structural frictions are likely to arise, and what the new framework offers in practice for Indian defence-industrial interests.

India-EU Security and Defence Partnership: Scope and Instruments

The Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and India constitutes the first dedicated framework of its kind in the EU-India relations³. It builds on long-standing political dialogue and sectoral cooperation, consolidating various strands of engagement (maritime security, cyber issues, hybrid threats, counterterrorism, non-proliferation, space) into a single, tailor-made arrangement.The partnership foresees an annual EU-India Security and Defence Dialogue, thematic consultations, and an India-EU Security of Information Agreement to facilitate exchanges of classified information. It also sits alongside a wider family of EU Security and Defence partnerships (SDPs) with partners such as Japan, South Korea, Canada, and the United Kingdom, highlighting that India is engaging through an emerging EU template rather than an entirely unique mechanism. 

Both Indian and European commentary note that this framework elevates India to the status of a key security partner rather than primarily a trade one ⁴. This partnership provides numerous opportunities for both the EU and India. For India, on the one hand, it creates a regular channel to discuss defence and technology cooperation beyond bilateral ties with individual member states, such as France and Germany. On the other hand, for the EU, the partnership supports the aim highlighted in the Strategic Compass and Indo-Pacific Strategy of deepening ties with like-minded partners to underpin a “rules-based order” without replicating alliance structures⁵.

At the same time, the Partnership text explicitly recognises that implementation must respect EU and Indian legal frameworks and decision-making autonomy⁶. It does not, by itself, change eligibility rules for India under programmes such as the European Defence Fund, European Defence Industrial Programme, or ReArm-related facilities⁷. Instead, the Security and Defence Partnership gradually shifts the political framing and consultation architecture (for what remains largely a set of bilateral, member-state-driven defence-industrial relationships) to the EU level, while also keeping open a procedural avenue for India to engage at that level. 

Europe’s Defence Rearmament and its Implications for India

The “ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030” initiative, presented by the European Commission, aims to significantly increase Europe’s defence spending. It does so  by allowing member states greater flexibility in their national budgets, creating a new EUR 150 billion loan facility called Security Action for Europe (SAFE) to support joint defence purchases and expanding the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB)⁸.

It is part of a wider move towards what some analysts call an ‘era of rearmament’, in which EU member states commit to higher defence budgets and explore new financing mechanisms for joint procurement and the development of industrial capacity⁹. Although the plan focuses on EU member states, it influences the broader market by signaling a sustained demand for munitions and related technologies over the coming decade.

An analysis by European think tanks explains that ReArm Europe mainly seeks to encourage higher defence spending by individual member states, while improving coordination at the EU level, rather than creating a fully centralised European defence system¹⁰. At the same time, most instruments of this programme restrict entities controlled from outside of the EU from participating in EU-funded projects or accessing certain financial tools¹¹. As a result, non-EU partners such as India currently have no automatic access to loans or grants under ReArm’s SAFE instrument, as SAFE provides loans to EU Member States for common procurement and allows non-EU participation only if the Union concludes a bilateral or multilateral agreement to open eligibility to Security and Defence Partnership countries. The Union adopts such agreements, and SAFE’s 65% European-content requirement constrains the share of non-EU (for example, Indian) components in procurements supported by the instrument¹².

Indian policy analyses note that Europe’s defence rearmament creates indirect opportunities for Indian firms if they meet technical and certification standards¹³. Existing experiences, such as Franco-Indian cooperation on aircraft and engines and co-development of naval platforms, suggest that Indian industry can integrate into European supply chains when political trust and industrial complementarity exist^{14 15}. However, these arrangements so far have been negotiated bilaterally with member states rather than through EU-level instruments. Still, there is a possibility of EU-level negotiations in the future, given the recent security and defence partnership.

A simplified overview of the main EU-level frameworks and their implications for India is provided below:

Source: Author’s compilation based on data from European Commission and Parliament documents, and India-EU Summit materials

Technology Transfer, Legal Guarantees, and India’s Autonomy Concerns

Technology transfer is at the core of both sides’ expectations but is shaped by different logics and constraints. On the EU side, export-control rules, notably Regulation (EU) 2021/821 on the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items¹⁶, and industrial-policy concerns combined define how the limitation of when and how sensitive technologies can be shared with third-country entities¹⁷. Companies benefiting from EU support or operating within EU regulatory frameworks are to ensure that intellectual property and critical knowledge are not transferred in ways that could undermine European security or competitiveness.

On the Indian side, ‘Make in India” and “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” in defence aim to reduce import dependence by fostering local production and developing design and systems-integration capabilities¹⁸. However, over the years, the emphasis has shifted from simple licensed production and spares assembly to joint development models that facilitate genuine technology absorption and enable India to become a significant exporter in selected areas¹⁹.Strategic autonomy, articulated by Indian officials and leaders across successive governments, reinforces this preference by focusing on the importance of maintaining freedom of action and avoiding single-supplier dependence in core military capabilities. At the same time, India’s continued procurement relationship with Russia and the presence of legacy Russian platforms in its inventory reinforce European concerns about potential technology leakage or sanctions circumvention, adding a strategic layer to what might otherwise appear as purely regulatory caution. 

These positions may generate tensions in negotiations. Indian stakeholders seek deeper access to design data and critical subsystems, along with the flexibility to integrate jointly developed equipment into third-country markets. European companies and governments in their turn are more cautious, especially where technologies overlap with NATO-related capabilities or rely on sensitive dual-use components. In sum, the agreement does not resolve the trade-offs between openness and control, but the Security and Defence partnership offers a forum for addressing these issues systematically.

Navigating Conditionalities: Convergence and Friction

There are several domains where Indian and European interests show clear convergence. Both sides support more resilient defence supply chains and improved capacity to sustain long-duration operations, especially in maritime and air domains. Both also emphasise a rules-based maritime order in the Indo-Pacific and attach importance to cooperation in cyber and space security. In these domains, industrial collaboration on secure communications and situational awareness can be pursued with relatively lower sensitivity than core weapon platforms. In such fields, joint research projects and sharing testing or certification processes offer practical ways to advance cooperation without triggering the most stringent export-control obstacles.

Potential friction is greater around high-end platforms and certain dual-use technologies. EU frameworks typically limit the degree of control that non-EU entities can exercise over EU-funded projects and may require that key intellectual property remains with EU participants or is subject to strict conditions²⁰. India, meanwhile, is cautious about entering arrangements that could lock critical capabilities into European decision-making cycles or restrict its ability to export systems co-developed with EU partners to third countries. There are also some concerns in European capitals regarding India’s residual dependence on Russian equipment, and it can reinforce reluctance to share the most sensitive technologies or allow extensive re-export rights. These structural asymmetries are likely to surface in negotiations over complex air and naval platforms and missile-defence components.

For India, the most realistic near-term pathway into Europe’s rearmament dynamic appears to lie in carefully structured joint ventures and sub-contracting agreements with selected EU prime contractors, especially in segments where India already has manufacturing experience and established quality standards. In such cases, the Security and Defence Partnership can help by providing political backing and supporting dialogue on supply-chain resilience, without necessarily granting direct access to EU-level funding instruments that remain reserved for member states and closely associated partners.

Conclusion

The 2026 Security and Defence Partnership brings India into closer alignment with Europe’s evolving defence industrial and security agenda at such a time when both actors are seeking to balance external dependencies with greater strategic capacity of their own. It formalises and consolidates a set of sectoral interactions into a single framework that can serve as a platform to discuss sensitive issues related to technology transfer and aligns with India’s efforts to diversify beyond its traditional suppliers. At the same time, it embeds India within a broader pattern of EU Security and Defence Partnerships, signalling recognition of India as a key like-minded partner in an emerging, non-alliance-based security architecture.

Looking ahead, cooperation could potentially and structurally focus on domains such as maritime security, cyber, space, secure communications, and selected subsystems where dual-use sensitivities are manageable and export-control constraints are less acute. In contrast, differences in EU dual-use export controls and concerns related to India’s ties with Russia are likely to have a stronger impact on advanced platforms and highly sensitive technologies, thereby limiting the prospects for deep co-development. In this setting, the SDP mainly reduces political and regulatory uncertainty and creates a conditional procedural route towards instruments such as SAFE, but it does not by itself seem to challenge the largely bilateral nature of defence-industrial cooperation or the structural constraints arising from each side’s understanding of strategic autonomy.

Credits

Nitish Kumar Ahlawat

Author

Polina Digo

Editor

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this policy brief are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Hegemoniq.

Endnote:

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