Climate diplomacy is no longer defined solely by competition between major emitters. Among the multilateral institutions there is a more subtle but more significant change which is unfolding: the developing nations are increasingly influencing the rules, priorities, and the agenda of global climate governance.
In the past years the Global South has been depicted as fragile and helpless, susceptible to climatic changes and waiting to be financed and technologically advanced by the industrialised economies. That vulnerability remains real. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) reveals that in several years before 2020, developed countries had not achieved the USD 100 billion per year climate finance target, which further fuels frustration among developing states (OECD, 2022). Simultaneously, according to the estimates of the United Nations Environment Programme, the cost of adaptation to climate change in developing countries may reach USD 160 billion — USD 340 billion yearly by 2030 (UNEP, 2023). The magnitude of the gap has rendered progressive commitments politically inadequate.
However, recent bargaining rounds show that the developing countries are no longer limited to pleading based on morality. States in “Africa, Asia, and Latin America” have come together through organized diplomacy within the Group of 77 (G77), which represents over 130 developing countries to shape the results of negotiations. Climate agreements are mostly consensus-driven giving organised blocks significant leverage. The coordination of developing countries allows them to influence texts, postpone decisions, and redirect agendas.
The process of climate negotiations is largely consensual, which means that no decisions are passed without a formal objection by any party. Organised groups like the Group of 77 can be quite influential in this institutional environment: the developing countries can negotiate as a bloc, not as a divided group trying to bargain with divergent capacities but by organizing positions beforehand and ensuring bloc cohesion. This solidarity enables them to define the nature of negotiation texts, postpone the results that weaken the principles of equity, and divert priorities in multilateral forums. The consensus structure allows coordinated Southern diplomacy to convert political unity to bargaining leverage.
This was reflected in the preservation of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ in the Paris Agreement of 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015). Though attempts were made to render obligations universal, the difference in terms of historical emissions and level of development was still ingrained in the law. This was not an accidental result but an outcome of long-term coalition bargaining.
The formation of a Loss and Damage fund was one of the most vivid pieces of evidence of this coalition leverage, which appeared at COP27 in 2022. Over the years, developed countries have opposed the formal mechanisms that may suggest some liability or compensation to irreversible climate damage. Developing countries, especially the small island states and African nations put Loss and Damage in focus during negotiations. Southern coalitions have managed to negotiate their bargain through a well-planned negotiation strategy and refuse to water down the language, which allowed the text of the final decision to cover the development of a special fund (UNFCCC, 2022). Despite the unresolved issues on financial contributions and model of governance, the political breakthrough was a transition between symbolic recognition and institutional commitment. The episode is a demonstration that as a united form, developing countries can reinstate negotiation priorities and achieve structural results.
Southern assertiveness has also broadened the focal point of the climate talks in addition to the emission limits. African states have become more and more associated with climate vulnerability and sovereign debt distress demanding multilateral development banks reform. Most of the developing economies have expensive borrowing costs and fiscal space, which minimizes their capacity to fund adaptation and energy transitions. Southern coalitions are taking the climate debates to structural economic change, redirecting from emission management to debt and development finance restructuring during climate negotiations.
All in all, this change has come when the pressure is growing severe. The effects of climate have intensified in the developing countries. Constant deficits in finance have destroyed confidence. Geopolitical disintegration has constrained the capacity of traditional powers to dictate one-sided decisions. In this regard, coordinated coalition-building has been developed as a defensive mechanism as well as a strategic one.
Power asymmetries persist. The industrialized world is still enjoying the benefits of financial and technological superiority and polarization in the Global South still exists. Nevertheless, recent negotiations indicate that such a shift in climate multilateralism moves towards a collective Southern action, as opposed to being influenced by established hierarchies alone.
Climate governance is therefore becoming more distributive, contested, and politically structured. Equity is no longer a peripheral language in negotiation texts but an embedded principle shaping outcomes.
The dominant narrative continues to focus on major power rivalry. Yet the more durable transformation lies elsewhere. The Global South is no longer simply negotiating for protection. It is negotiating for power within the institutions that will govern the climate transition.